Network connectivity plays an important role in the information exchange between different agents in the multi-level networks. In this paper, we establish a game-theoretic framework to capture the uncoordinated nature of the decision making at different layers of the multi-level networks. To study the network resiliency, we introduce two adversarial attack models and quantify their impacts, and design a decentralized and resilient alternating-play algorithm that aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the global network under attack. We show that the designed algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps, and yields an equilibrium network. Moreover, simulation results of a two-layer mobile robotic networks corroborate and show the interdependency between different layers of networks in the recovery process.
: Two-layer robotic networks. One network consists of 5 UAVs, and the other network consists of 6 UGVs.
In our problem setting, each layer of the robotic network aims to maximize the connectivity of the overall network. If the whole network is fully cooperative or governed by a single agent, then the designed network is a team-optimal solution. However, in practice, different layers of robotic networks are often operated by different entities, which makes the coordination between separate entities difficult. For example, in the previous UAV and UGV two-layer networks in Fig.  1 , though the objectives for two networks are aligned, UAV is operated by the air force while UGV is operated by the army, which could lead to insufficient coordination. To address this problem, we establish a game-theoretic model in which two players control robots to maximize the global connectivity independently. This framework captures the lack of coordination between players in multi-level networks. Furthermore, it guides the algorithmic design of decentralized mechanism for achieving an equilibrium solution that is sufficiently close to the team-optimal solution. In this paper, two players update their own network in a round robin fashion based on the current network to maximize the network connectivity. This alternating-play mechanism generates an iterative algorithm which converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) after a finite number of steps and yields an equilibrium robotic network.
A mobile robotic network is prone to adversarial attacks since a robot can be captured by an adversary (e.g., [4, 5] ), and the communication links between robots can be jammed (e.g., [6, 7] ). Therefore, resilient control of the multi-level robotic networks to malicious attacks is critical to enhance its resiliency. To this end, we model the mobility of the robots by taking into account the communication links within and across the networks, and use a game-theoretic approach to develop resilient and decentralized algorithm for individual networks. To study the network resiliency, we consider two attack models including physical attack and cyber attack. To quantify the impact of each type of attack, we measure the difference of the algebraic connectivity of the network under a certain type attack and without attack. In addition, we obtain closed forms for the worst cases of cyber attack, and identify the interdependencies that exist in the multilevel networks. Simulation results show that node removal attack will lead to the largest decrease of the network connectivity, and robotic networks are most resilient to physical attack than other attacks by using the proposed control method. Furthermore, robots in the network without attack can always figure out the best positions that can set up more intra-links with robots in the attacked network during the recovery process, which shows the existence of interdependency in multi-level networks.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We establish a game-theoretic framework that enables decentralized control of mobile robots in the multi-level networks.
• We propose two attack models, and obtain the closed form solutions for the worst cases of cyber attack.
• We design a resilient and decentralized alternating-play algorithm that aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the global network.
• We show the convergence of the designed algorithm to a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps, and corroborate its resiliency by numerical simulations.
Related Work
In the previous works, robotic network connectivity control problem is often addressed either in a totally centralized way (e.g., [8, 1] ) or completely decentralized way (e.g., [9, 3, 10, 11] ). The centralized framework yields an optimal network but with low resiliency, since responses to failures in a global network may not be instantaneous. The network resulting from the decentralized framework is resilient, however, it is difficult to achieve the optimal with limited coordination. Our proposed framework stands in between these two frameworks, and thus leads to balanced features in terms of resiliency and optimality.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some basics of graph theory. Section 3 formulates the multilevel network formation game problem. Network connectivity control is studied in Section 4. Section 5 introduces two types of malicious attacks to the network, and Section 6 quantifies the network resiliency and interdependency to attacks. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Background
Let G(V, E) be an undirected graph composed by n nodes and interconnected by m links. For a link e that connects nodes i and j where the link weight equaling to w ij , we define a vector b e , where b e (i) = w ij , b e (j) = −w ij , and other entries 0. Then, the Laplacian matrix L of network G can be expressed as
For the weighted Laplacian matrix L, its diagonal entries L ii is the weight of node i, and L ij = −w ij if nodes i and j are connected, and otherwise is 0. Additionally, Laplacian matrix is positive semidefinite, and L1 = 0, where 1 is a vector will all one entries. Thus, by ordering the eigenvalues of L in an increase way, we obtain
where λ 2 (L) is called algebraic connectivity of G. For a two-layer interdependent network, we define two networks G 1 (V 1 , E 1 ) and G 2 (V 2 , E 2 ), which have n 1 and n 2 nodes, respectively. Then, the global network resulting from the connection of these two networks can be denoted as
, where E 12 represents intra-links between G 1 and G 2 . The adjacency matrix A of the global network G has the entry a ij defined as follows: a ij = w ij , nodes i and j are connected; 0, nodes i and j are not connected.
Let A 1 and A 2 be the adjacency matrices of G 1 and G 2 , respectively, and n = n 1 + n 2 . When E 12 = ∅, the adjacency matrix A takes the following form
where B 12 ∈ R n 1 ×n 2 is an off-diagonal matrix used to capture the effect of intra-links between networks. Next, define two diagonal matrices D 1 ∈ R n 1 ×n 1 and D 2 ∈ R n 2 ×n 2 as follows:
Then, by using L = D − A, we obtain the Laplacian matrix
where L 1 and L 2 are the Laplacians corresponding to A 1 and A 2 , respectively.
Problem Formulation
In this section, we will first formulate a multi-level mobile robotic network formation game problem, and then define its Nash equilibrium.
Game Problem Formulation
The position of robots in the network is defined by the vector x(t) = x 1 (t), x 2 (t), ..., x n (t) ∈ R 2n , and the dynamic of each robot i is as follows:
where u i (t) ∈ R 2 is the control of robot i at time t. Robots in the same network can exchange data via wireless communications. Denote the communication link between robots i and j as (i, j). Then, the strength of the communication link (i, j) is similar to the weight of the link in a network. Thus, we associate a weight function w : R 2 × R 2 → R + with every communication link (i, j), such that for some f : R + → R + , where x ij (t) = x i (t) − x j (t). Usually, the strength of a communication link decays exponentially with the distance. Therefore, the entries A ij of the adjacency matrix A are as follows:
0,
When the distance between robots is less than ρ 1 , the connectivity strength is up to 1; when the distance is larger than ρ 2 , robots lose the connection. Fig. 2 (a) is an example of A ij when α = 5, ρ 1 = 0.7, ρ 2 = 1.3. Fig. 2(b) shows the model of a two-layer mobile robotic networks. Red robots belong to network G 1 , and blue robots belong to network G 2 . More generally, label robots in G 1 as 1, 2, ..., n 1 , and robots in G 2 as n 1 + 1, n 1 + 2, ..., n 1 + n 2 . Robots in these two layers can also communicate, and this kind of communication link is called intra-link. Obviously, exchanging data between robots in different layers is more difficult than that the robots in the same layer because of much further distance. Thus, we assume that the communication strength of intra-links has a larger value of ρ 1 and ρ 2 comparing with that in Fig. 2(a) .
For simplicity, define −γ {1, 2} \ γ, where γ ∈ {1, 2}. We consider two players, player 1 (P 1 ) and player 2 (P 2 ), that are playing a network formation game. P 1 controls robots in network G 1 , and P 2 controls robots in G 2 . Specifically, P 1 and P 2 updates their own network alternatively by controlling the robots' position. For each update, P γ 's strategy is based on the current configuration of network G −γ . Moreover, both players' aim is to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the whole network G at every step. The action spaces for P 1 and P 2 are F 1 and F 2 , respectively, which include all possible network configurations. The set of pure strategy profiles F = F 1 × F 2 is the Cartesian product of the individual pure strategy sets. The utility function for both players is λ 2 L G (x) :
One of the constraints is the minimum distance between robots in the same layer. Without this constraint, all robots in the same layer will converge to one point finally which is unreasonable in reality. Thus, we assign a minimum distance between robots ρ 1 and ρ 1 for G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Thus, game problem formulation is described by the following two optimization problems.
Q 2 : max
where τ 1 and τ 2 are the time constants.
Nash Equilibrium of the Game
After P 1 takes his action at time t, G 1 and G 12 are reconfigured, where G 12 is the network between G 1 and G 2 . We denote network G 1 and G 12 at time t as G 1,t and G 12,t , respectively. For simplicity, we further define
Similarly, after P 2 updates network G 2 at time t, the whole network
Additionally, denote G 1 and G 2 as the sets that contain all G 12,t and G 21,t for all t, respectively. Then, the definition of Nash equilibrium of the game is given as follows.
Definition 1. Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile f * , where
for ∀ G 12,t ∈ G 1 , and ∀ G 21,t ∈ G 2 .
Optimization-based Network Connectivity Control
The function λ 2 (L(x)) is concave of L(x) in the space of 1 ⊥ given by the infimum of a set of linear
which is equivalent to the following definition:
Therefore, the problem max x∈R 2n λ 2 (L(x)) gives rise to convex optimization approaches to the robotic network connectivity control problem.
Theorem 1 ([12]
). The optimization problem max x∈R 2n λ 2 (L(x)) is equivalent to the following problem :
where α is the objective function, and I n is an n-dimensional identity matrix.
Discretization
For each update of the network, it is essentially not continuous in time. Both players' strategies for the next step are based on the current network. Therefore, for simplicity, we discretize problems (6) and (7). First, we deal with the minimum distance constraint in problem (6) and (7) . Note that ||x ij (t)|| 2 2 ≥ ρ, and we denote Z ij (t) = ||x ij (t)|| 2 2 . Then, we differentiate ||x ij (t)|| 2 2 with respect to time, and obtain 2{ẋ
Then, by using Euler's first order method
where t is the sample time, we rewrite (11) and arrive at ([2])
Similarly, differentiating and discretizing weight w ij yields
Therefore, we can obtain a discrete Laplacian matrix L x(k) by using (13).
Problem Reformulation
By using (10) and (12), we reformulate the problem (6) and (7):
Besides, we obtain the discrete Laplacian matrix L G (k+1) by using (13) , and its entries l G ij (k+1) are as follows:
P 1 controls robots in G 1 and reconfigures the network by solving the optimization problem (14) to obtain the new position of each robot. P 2 controls robots in network G 2 in a similar way by solving (15). The problem becomes a semidefinite programming (SDP) problem, and hence can be solved efficiently by using a SDP solver. The iterative algorithm is to solve (14) and (15) in an alternating fashion until the solution reaches an equilibrium.
Feasibility and Convergence
Regarding the feasibility of the problems (14) and (15), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For a given initial multi-level mobile robots network where the distance between robots satisfies the predefined minimum distance constraint, the game problems (14) and (15) are always feasible.
Proof. Since problems (14) and (15) are similar, without loss of generality, we only analyze (14). Given an initial configuration of the network, we calculate its algebraic connectivity, and denote it as α 0 1 . P 1 aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity by updating his network. For the first step, ∀f 1,1 ∈ F 1 , if the algebraic connectivity α 1 1 of the network is no larger than α 0 1 after P 1 taking his action f 1,1 , i.e., α 0 1 ≥ α 1 1 , then, the optimal solution to (14) is α 1 * 1 = α 0 1 which means that P 1 will not modify the configuration of the current network. Therefore, for a given network, a feasible solution to (14) always exists.
For the convergence of the iterative algorithm, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The iterative algorithm is converging during the alternating game, and it converges to a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps.
Adversarial Attacks in the Networks
We consider two main types of Adversarial attacks in the network, i.e., physical attack, and cyber attack.
Physical Attack
We consider the physical attack scenario where the physical movement of a robot is constrained. One example is that one UGV is conquered by the enemy, and it cannot move but still maintain its communication with other UGVs in the network. We assume that the attack cannot last forever, but for a period of time τ a . Reasons include that the resource of an attacker is constrained, and the abnormal/unexpected behavior of the robot resulting from the physical attack can be detected by the network administrator, and thus will be removed after some time.
If robot i is compromised at time t 1 , then we add the following constraint to the problem (14) and (15):
The attacked robot is usually randomly chosen. In this paper, we select the robot that has the maximum degree to be attacked, and denote it as I max . Specifically,
Cyber Attack
Cyber attack can cause link removal and node removal by disrupting the communications between nodes. For example, terrorists aim to destroy the communication between robots, then they may send large amounts of spam into the channel which eventually leads to link breakdown because of overload of the link. Next, we analyze link removal and node removal attacks, respectively.
Link removal:
Denote the network asG(i, j) = (V, E \ (i, j)) after removing a link (i, j) ∈ E from network G, then, we have L = L − ∆L and ∆L = ∆D − ∆A, where ∆D and ∆A are the decreased degree and adjacency matrices, respectively. By using equation (1), we obtain ∆D and ∆A as follows:
where e i and e i are a zero vectors except their i-th elements are equal to 1 and w ij , respectively.
Denote the Laplacian matrix of G(i, j) as L(i, j), and by using equations (18), we have
Similar to the physical attack, link removal attack lasts for time τ b . In order to incorporate the link removal attack into the mobile robots networks model, we should add the following constraint to the Laplacian matrix:
where (i, j) is the attacked link, and t 2 is the starting point of the attack .
Node removal:
When a node i ∈ V is removed from the network G, then, all links that attached to node i should also be removed. Denote the Laplacian matrix of the network after the attack as L(i). Similar to the analysis of link removal, we have
where N i is the set of the nodes that are connected to node i. If robot i is attacked at time t 3 , and the attack lasts for τ c time. Then, the following constraint is added to the Laplacian matrix:
The Worst Cases of Cyber Attacks
Cyber attackers are usually smart, i.e., attackers intentionally attack the communication links or robots that their removal will lead to most decrease of network connectivity.
The worst case of link removal:
When link (i, j) is attacked, the resulting Laplacian of G is shown in (19). Denote the Fiedler vector of L as u, and by using (9), we obtain the following:
Therefore, by removing the link (i, j) * , where
the upper bound for λ 2 L(i, j) is the smallest, and the algebraic connectivity of G decreases the most. Figure 3 : Configuration of a two-layer robotic network without attack.
The worst case of node removal:
When robot i is attacked, the Laplacian of G is changed to (21). Similar to the analysis of the most severe link attack, we obtain the following:
Hence, by attacking robot i * , where
algebraic connectivity of G encounters the most decrease. Remark : Depending on the scope of knowledge that the attacker has of the network, our proposed game framework can be used for attackers of different knowledge levels. For example, an attacker may know the information of the whole multi-level network or merely one sub-network. For the former case of attack, closed form solutions have already been presented above, and the analysis for the latter case can be done in a similar way.
Resiliency and Interdependency of Multilevel Networks to Attacks
In this section, we quantify the impact of malicious attacks introduced in Section 5, and assess the resiliency and interdependency of the network to attacks. 
Impact of Malicious Attacks
In the simulation, we use YALMIP (see [13] ) to solve the corresponding SDP problems. We assume that both networks A and B include 6 mobile robots, and link strength parameters for inter-links are the same. For intra-links, link strength parameters are ρ 1 = 1.5, ρ 2 = 3 and α = 1. Fig. 3 shows the initial and final configurations of the robotic networks without any attacks. Then, we quantify the impact of each type of attack based on the single-layer network model. Specifically, we add the physical, link removal and node removal attacks to the network at time step 4 during the network formation game, respectively. All attacks last for two time steps. Results of algebraic connectivity over iterations are shown in Fig. 4 . The blue trajectory in Fig. 4 shows the evolution of algebraic connectivity of the network without attack, which is non-decreasing and reaches the equilibrium point after approximate 10 steps. In addition, the node removal is the most severe Figure 6 : Trajectories of the algebraic connectivity of the two-layer network formation game without attacks and with the worst case of node removal attacks.
attack which is worse than the link removal, and the physical attack is the least severe one.
Resiliency of the Network to Attacks
The metric used for quantifying the resiliency of the network is its recovery speed after the adversarial attack. In Fig. 4 , the network begins to recover from the second time step after the attack. When the attack is removed, the recovery speed becomes faster, and the network reaches an equilibrium state after a finite number of steps, which indicates the inherent resiliency of the network to attacks. Moreover, with the designed iterative algorithm, network is most resilient to the physical attack, i.e., the recovery process is the fastest among three attack cases. Besides, an interesting observation is that the equilibrium points of these cases are the same.
Interdependency of Multi-level Robotic Networks
We use the model in Fig. 3 , and add the most severe attack, i.e., the worst case of node removal, to network A but not network B at the time step 4, and the attack will not be removed. The final configuration of the network is shown in Fig. 5 , and the trajectory of the algebraic connectivity during the network formation game is shown in Fig. 6 . The results show that the final configuration of the unattacked robotic network is the same as that in Fig. 3 , but it takes more steps for the network to reach the equilibrium state. The existence of interdependency in multi-level networks can be observed by comparing the network configuration in Fig. 3 with that in Fig. 5 . Robots in the network without attack can always figure out the best positions that can set up more intralinks with robots in the attacked network. Furthermore, there is a gap of the algebraic connectivity between the different equilibrium networks in Fig. 6 because of the node removal attack.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the connectivity control of multi-level robotic networks. We have developed a decentralized resilient algorithm to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the network to adversarial attacks, and shown its convergence to a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of iterations. Physical and cyber attack models have been introduced, and their impacts have been quantified. Moreover, simulation results have shown that robotic networks are the most resilient to physical attack than other cyber attacks by using the proposed control method. Future work can be designing a model predictive control algorithm that enables robots connectivity-aware during the network formation game.
